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Introduction	
What	is	the	potential	of	happiness?	How	can	a	captured	line	be	free?	Is	there	
hope	in	hopelessness?	In	A	Thousand	Plateaus,	radical	post-structuralist	
philosophers	Gilles	Deleuze	and	Felix	Guattari	write,	“only	a	line	of	flight	[is]	forever	
in	the	process	of	being	drawn,	toward	a	new	acceptance,	the	opposite	of	
renunciation	or	resignation-	a	new	happiness?”	(1987,	207).	This	“new	happiness”	is	
the	central	theme	of	this	thesis.	I	will	use	Deleuze	and	Guattari	to	examine	three	
seemingly	unrelated	literary	texts:	Fodor	Dostoyevsky’s	White	Nights,	Lucy	Maud	
Montgomery’s	Anne	of	Green	Gables,	and	John	Green’s	Paper	Towns.	According	to	
Brian	Massumi,	celebrated	translator	of	Deleuze	and	Guattari’s	works	and	an	
accomplished	philosopher	in	his	own	right,	when	analyzing	texts	with	a	Deleuzian	
lens,	“the	reader	is	invited	to	lift	a	dynamism	out	of	the	book	and	incarnate	it	in	a	
foreign	medium”	(8).	By	lifting	Deleuze	and	Guattari’s	concepts	out	of	their	own	
writing	and	applying	them	to	the	analysis	of	these	works	of	literature,	I	will	
demonstrate	how	lines	of	flight	present	different	ways	for	the	characters	to	find	new	
happinesses	in	their	territorialized	lives,	to	varying	degrees	of	success,	developing	a	
new	concept	of	the	line	of	flight	as	a	path	to	find	hope,	freedom,	and	ultimately	
happiness	in	a	current	world	where	everything	is	restricted,	regulated,	and	defined	
by	all	manner	of	social	constructs.		
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To	accomplish	this,	this	paper	will	conduct	a	sustained	engagement	with	
Deleuze	and	Guattari	on	their	innovative	theories	for	reading	literature,	first	by	
introducing	some	of	their	important	philosophical	concepts	into	the	texts	as	a	way	
to	think	about	hope,	freedom,	and	happiness,	and	then	using	this	analysis	to	
produce	new	definitions	for	hope,	freedom,	and	happiness	as	they	function	in	
modern	society.	By	reading	these	works	of	literature	in	the	manner	that	one	reads	
philosophy,	putting	books	and	ideas	together	to	create	something	in	their	
interaction,	the	books	become	machines	that	actively	produce	new	meanings	from	
the	context	in	which	they	are	read.	When	interpreting	literature	by	this	method,	“the	
question	is	not,	Is	it	true?	But,	Does	it	work?	What	new	thoughts	does	it	make	
possible	to	feel?	What	new	sensations	and	perceptions	does	it	open	in	the	body?”	
(8).	Using	these	questions,	the	meanings	I	will	construct	from	my	readings	of	these	
texts	will	be	more	than	simply	a	new	interpretation	of	older	literature;	the	analysis	
will	be	the	form	with	which	to	produce	new	concepts	about	the	lives	of	the	readers	
of	these	works.		
	
Deleuze	and	Literature:	Using	Literature	as	a	Productive	Object	
Deleuze	is	one	of	the	most	influential	French	philosophers	of	the	twentieth	
century.	He	produced	works	on	the	history	of	philosophy,	including	studies	on	
David	Hume,	Friedrich	Nietzsche,	Immanuel	Kant,	Henri	Bergson,	Baruch	Spinoza,	
Michel	Foucault,	and	Gottfried	Leibniz,	as	well	as	analyses	on	the	arts,	cinema,	and	a	
large	collection	of	essays	on	literature.	At	the	center	of	his	thought	was	the	simple	
belief	that	philosophy	is	the	production	of	concepts.	He	collaborated	with	political	
 
 
6	
activist	and	radical	psychoanalyst,	Guattari,	to	create	many	of	his	major	works:	Anti-
Oedipus	(1972),	A	Thousand	Plateaus	(1980),	and	What	is	Philosophy	?	(1991).	
Deleuze	and	Guattari	are	recognized	for	their	unorthodox	and	heterodox	
philosophy,	and	especially	for	the	way	they	use	language	to	produce	new	concepts	
that	transform	post-structuralist	Western	philosophy.	They	became	known	for	such	
concepts	as	the	line	of	flight,	rhizomes,	nomad	thought,	plateaus,	and	
territorialization/deterritorialization.	
Deleuze	and	Guattari’s	work	has	paved	the	way	for	a	whole	new	way	of	
thinking	about	meaning	in	society.	Their	ideas	can	be	applied	to	anything,	from	
human	relationships,	works	of	art,	popular	culture,	to	the	interstate	highway	
system;	the	list	goes	on	forever	in	infinite	directions.	The	multitude	of	scholarly	
works	of	this	nature	has	spurred	the	creation	of	Edinburgh	University	Press’s	
academic	journal,	Deleuze	Studies.	Started	in	2007	and	in	continued	publication	
today,	Deleuze	Studies	according	to	Edinburgh	Press	“is	neither	a	philosophy	journal,	
nor	a	literature	journal,	nor	a	cultural	studies	journal,	but	all	three	and	more.	
Articles	explore	the	work	of	Gilles	Deleuze	and	Félix	Guattari,	as	well	as	critical	
reviews	of	the	growing	field,	new	translations	and	annotated	bibliographies”	
(Deleuze	and	Guattari	Studies).		
In	addition	to	this	journal,	books	such	as	Ian	Buchanan	and	John	Marks’	
Deleuze	and	Literature	analyze	the	use	of	a	Deleuzian	style	of	thinking	in	the	study	of	
literature.	Buchanan	and	Marks	say	of	this	type	of	analysis,	“literature	can	plunge	
into	the	‘middle’	and	exhaust	the	possibilities	of	the	event,	laying	them	out	on	a	
plane	of	immanence.	In	doing	so,	the	writer	eschews	the	ressentiment	and	the	
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tendency	towards	judgement”	(Buchanan	and	Marks,	2).	In	other	words,	Deleuze	
and	Guattari’s	concepts	allow	for	the	analysis	of	literature	not	as	a	chronological	
explanation	of	an	event	or	as	a	piece	of	language	that	is	“good”	or	not,	but	as	a	
function	of	language	itself,	producing	meaning	through	its	analysis	rather	than	
within	the	words	and	events	in	and	of	themselves.	“For	Deleuze,	it	is	a	question	of	
bringing	into	existence	rather	than	judging…	it	is	rather	a	question	of	being	flexible	
enough	in	one’s	thinking	to	allow	something	new	to	enter	into	existence”	(2-3).		
This	is	not	to	say	that	traditional	methods	of	literary	analysis	are	invalid:	
“sometimes	it	is	necessary	to	restore	the	lost	parts,	to	rediscover	everything	that	
cannot	be	seen	in	the	image,	everything	that	has	been	removed	to	make	it	
‘interesting’”	(4).	Symbols,	motifs,	extended	metaphors,	and	other	figurative	
language	used	by	the	author	to	intentionally	convey	deeper	meanings	can	reveal	
much	about	the	moral	or	purpose	of	the	story	in	a	work	of	fiction,	and	the	execution	
of	these	techniques	provides	a	structured	way	with	which	to	measure	a	writer’s	
skill.	“But	sometimes,	on	the	contrary,	it	is	necessary	to	make	holes,	to	introduce	
voids	and	white	spaces,	to	rarify	the	image,	by	suppressing	many	things	that	have	
been	added	to	make	us	believe	that	we	are	seeing	everything”	(4).	Using	Deleuze	
with	literature	allows	meanings	to	be	produced	by	the	reader	that	were	not	
intentionally	left	there	by	the	author	for	the	reader	to	find,	but	these	meanings	are	
no	less	real	and	affective	for	the	infinite	nature	of	their	interpretation.		
Deleuze	and	Guattari	themselves	have	written	extensively	on	literature.	“We	
will	never	ask	what	a	book	means,”	they	say,	“as	signified	or	signifier;	we	will	not	
look	for	anything	to	understand	in	it.	We	will	ask	what	it	functions	with,	in	
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connection	with	what	other	things	it	does	or	does	not	transmit	intensities	[	.	.	.	]	A	
book	exists	only	through	the	outside	and	on	the	outside.	A	book	itself	is	a	little	
machine”	(Deleuze	1987,	4).	Deleuze	and	Guattari’s	analyses	of	books	as	machines	
include	writings	on	Herman	Melville’s	Bartleby	the	Scrivener	and	the	novella	as	a	
form.	“Bartleby;	Or	the	Formula”	is	an	essay	in	Deleuze’s	Critical	and	Clinical,	a	
collection	of	his	literary	criticisms.	Deleuze	focuses	on	Melville’s	formula,	“I	would	
prefer	not	to,”	the	line	which	the	main	character	Bartleby	constantly	repeats	
throughout	the	story,	baffling	his	employer.	Deleuze	says	“perhaps	it	is	the	formula	
that	carves	out	a	kind	of	foreign	language	within	the	language”	(1997,	71).	This	new	
use	of	the	language	to	produce	the	phrase	“I	would	prefer	not	to,”	which	is	neither	
grammatically	correct	nor	easy	to	follow	in	terms	of	literal	meaning,	incapacitates	
Bartleby’s	boss	to	do	anything	to	contradict	Bartleby	because	he	does	not	know	how	
to	respond.	The	formula	creates	a	different	language	within	the	language	which	
takes	the	language	as	a	whole	“into	flight,	pushing	it	to	its	very	limit	in	order	to	
discover	its	Outside,	silence	or	music”	(1997,	71).	There	is	no	hidden	meaning	in	
that	particular	phrase,	“I	would	prefer	not	to.”	It	is	the	unconventionality	of	the	form	
itself	that	allows	for	new	meaning	to	be	produced	outside	of	the	structure	and	
context	known	to	society,	and	this	departure	from	convention	is	what	prevents	the	
boss	from	being	able	to	respond	in	any	conventional	way.	
Deleuze	breaks	down	this	formula	and	its	use	throughout	the	novella,	but	
contends	from	the	outset	that,	“Bartleby	is	neither	a	metaphor	for	the	writer	nor	the	
symbol	of	anything	whatsoever.	It	is	a	violently	comical	text,	and	the	comical	is	
always	literal.	It	is	like	the	novellas	of	Kleist,	Dostoyevsky,	Kafka,	or	Beckett,	with	
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which	it	forms	a	subterranean	and	prestigious	lineage.	It	means	only	what	it	says,	
literally”	(1997,	68).	Throughout	his	analysis	of	this	Melville	work,	Deleuze	
maintains	that	the	formula	Melville	uses	is	not	an	instrument	to	explain	human	
nature,	but	instead	a	function	to	produce	new	meaning	in	language.	It	is	not	
arbitrary,	but	it	does	not	lead	us	back	to	reason	within	the	literal.	The	literal	exists	
only	within	the	story	but	produces	a	logic	with	which	to	analyze	what	is	outside	of	
the	story.	The	reader	is	not	supposed	to	look	at	the	story	of	Bartleby	as	life	advice	
about	how	to	get	out	of	work,	but	Melville’s	story	is	also	not	an	allegory	with	a	
greater	lesson	or	moral.	It	is	an	experiment	of	language	that	pushes	the	boundaries	
of	convention.	When	analyzed	with	a	Deleuzian	lens,	the	content	of	the	story	of	
Bartleby	is	important	only	in	the	fact	that	it	sets	up	the	form,	and	the	literal	events	
that	take	place	in	the	story	are	only	important	in	that	they	break	that	form.	This	use	
of	literature	as	an	object,	then	becomes	the	“point”	or	“deeper	meaning”	derived	
from	the	work	of	literature.	
Deleuze	also	writes	about	literature	in	A	Thousand	Plateaus	in	the	chapter	
entitled	“1874:	Three	Novellas,	or	What	Happened.”	He	uses	Henry	James’	“In	the	
Cage,”	F.	Scott	Fitzgerald’s	“The	Crack	Up,”	and	Pierrette	Fleutiaux’s	“The	Story	of	
the	Abyss	and	the	Spyglass”	to	produce	meanings	from	these	specific	works	of	
literature	by	using	the	events	of	the	stories	to	delineate	new	concepts	of	three	
different	types	of	life	lines.	The	first	is	segmented	and	rigid:	“everything	seems	
calculable	and	foreseen	[	.	.	.	]	so	are	people	as	elements	of	an	aggregate,	as	are	
feelings	as	relations	between	people;	they	are	segmented	[	.	.	.	]	to	ensure	and	
control	the	identity	of	each	agency	including	personal	identity”	(1987,	195).	This	
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type	of	life	line	is	of	plans	and	expectations,	clearly	defined	relationships	between	
people,	and	categorizing	identities	of	oneself	and	others.	The	story,	“In	the	Cage,”	is	
about	a	telegrapher	who	pieces	together	bits	of	information	about	her	clients’	lives	
through	the	messages	she	sends	and	receives	for	them.	These	snippets	of	
information	are	the	first	type	of	life	line	that	Deleuze	produces,	not	as	an	intentional	
symbol	in	the	novella	but	by	the	use	of	the	literature	as	a	machine	to	produce	this	
concept.	The	words	and	conversations,	explanations,	and	precise	knowledge	and	
facts	in	the	telegrams	are	not	representative	of	the	first	type	of	line,	but	literally	
constitute	it.	
	With	the	second	line,	the	line	of	molecular	or	supple	segmentation,	“a	
present	is	defined	whose	very	form	is	the	form	of	something	that	has	already	
happened	[	.	.	.	]	traveling	at	speeds	beyond	the	ordinary	thresholds	of	perception”	
(1987,	196).	The	telegraphist	finds	out	more	than	she	wanted	to	know	from	her	
snooping	and	learns	of	the	existence	of	a	dark	secret,	but	because	she	only	gets	the	
information	that	is	in	the	telegrams,	she	has	to	try	to	piece	together	the	rest	of	the	
story	of	what	happened	in	her	own	mind.	Whatever	happened	has	already	
happened;	it	is	absolutely	not	imaginary,	but	there	are	infinite	possible	segments	
that	could	make	up	this	unknown,	making	this	life	line	itself	tangled	and	
deterritorialized,	or	not	able	to	be	defined	by	any	particular	set	of	conventions.	The	
actual	information	that	is	kept	secret	is	not	important;	it's	the	existence	of	a	secret	
that	creates	Deleuze’s	second	type	of	line.	
The	third	line	is	the	line	of	flight,	which	explodes	through	the	segmentary	
nature	of	the	other	two	lines,	“attain[ing]	a	kind	of	absolute	deterritorialization.”	
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The	telegraphist	“ended	up	knowing	so	much	that	she	could	no	longer	interpret	
anything”	(1987,	197).	Without	areas	of	unknown,	there	is	no	framework	on	which	
to	build	what	is	known,	there	is	no	direction,	and	the	life	line	itself	becomes	a	kind	
of	abstract	everywhereness.	However,	the	line	of	flight	is	not	a	final	destination;	the	
three	lines	continually	intermingle,	and	the	telegraphist	moves	on	to	marry	her	
fiancé	and	leaves	the	lives	she	became	a	part	of	as	the	telegraphist	to	exist	as	they	
are	in	a	variety	of	types	of	lines	without	a	single	meaning,	direction,	or	end.	
Deleuze	goes	on	to	use	these	concepts	of	different	types	of	lines	to	interpret	
what	happens	in	the	stories	of	the	other	two	novellas	to	translate	them	into	texts	
which	produce	meanings	about	real	life	as	well.	His	interpretations	of	these	three	
novellas	in	A	Thousand	Plateaus	and	his	essay	on	Bartleby	are	formal	models	in	this	
essay;	their	inclusion	is	to	demonstrate	how	Deleuze	and	Guattari	use	literature	to	
produce	concepts	about	life	and	use	those	concepts	to	produce	meanings	from	
literature.	If	valid,	this	process	could	be	done	over	and	over	again,	always	producing	
new	affects	and	creating	concepts	that	explain	a	constantly	modern	new	form	of	life.	
	
Materials	and	Method:	Posing	the	Question	
The	Deleuzian	concepts	I	will	apply	in	the	literary	analysis	are	those	of	de-	
and	re-	territorialization,	lines	of	flight,	and	rhizomes,	as	defined	in	the	introduction	
and	the	section	on	Nomadology	in	A	Thousand	Plateaus.	All	of	these	concepts	are	
examples	of	nomadic	thought,	which	functions	without	linear	definitions.	Rather	
than	following	a	preconceived	pattern,	nomad	thought	jumps	across	and	between	
boundaries	of	structured	spaces	in	society	to	create	a	whole	new	tracing	of	the	map	
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of	societal	understanding,	in	the	same	way	as	Nomadic	people	are	always	moving	to	
new	areas	rather	than	permanently	settling	down	in	one	location.	To	use	Deleuzian	
language,	nomad	thought	deterritorializes	spaces	that	had	been	fixed	and	offers	
lines	of	flight	towards	new	experiences	and	new	ways	to	create	meaning.	The	
pattern,	or	rather	lack	thereof,	of	the	line	of	flight	in	nomad	thought	is	a	rhizome:	a	
shape	with	no	start	or	end	or	direction.	The	rhizome	is	instead	composed	entirely	of	
the	middle	and	travels	not	just	within	the	stratified	spaces	of	societal	
comprehension	but	through	and	beyond	them,	without	points	except	those	of	
departure,	which	are	motion	themselves.	“Every	rhizome	contains	lines	of	
segmentarity	according	to	which	is	stratified,	territorialized,	organized,	signified,	
attributed,	etc.,	as	well	as	lines	of	deterritorialization	down	which	it	constantly	flees.	
There	is	a	rupture	in	the	rhizome	wherein	segmentary	lines	explode	into	a	line	of	
flight,	but	the	line	of	flight	is	part	of	the	rhizome”	(9).	Meaning	found	through	
nomadic	analysis	does	not	already	exist	under	the	surface,	there	to	be	found	
through	interpretation,	but	is	produced	as	by	a	machine	in	its	individual	social,	
historical,	or	literary	context.		
The	first	work	of	literature	I	will	apply	these	Deleuzian	concepts	to	is	Lucy	
Maud	Montgomery’s	Anne	of	Green	Gables,	a	lovely	children’s	bildungsroman	about	
an	optimistic	orphaned	girl,	Anne,	as	she	comes	to	understand	the	world	of	growing	
up.	Set	in	early	20th	century	Prince	Edward	Island	and	following	the	long	tradition	
of	foundling	sentimentalist	novels	of	the	time,	the	novel	recounts	Anne’s	many	
struggles	and	wonderful	adventures	as	she	settles	into	normal	life	at	Green	Gables,	
which	is	the	only	home	she	has	ever	known.	Although	Montgomery	went	on	to	write	
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eight	further	novels	about	Anne	and	later	her	children,	the	analysis	in	this	paper	will	
focus	on	the	first	book	alone,	without	considering	the	plot	events	to	come	as	fact	
within	the	fictional	framework.	The	next	work	to	be	analyzed,	Fyodor	Dostoyevsky’s	
White	Nights,	is	a	short	story	about	an	unnamed	narrator	who	falls	in	love	with	a	
flighty	girl	who	ends	up	going	back	to	her	first	love	and	leaving	the	narrator	in	
despair,	but	the	text	ends	before	the	reader	can	conclude	whether	the	narrator	has	
hope	for	a	brighter	future.	The	story	takes	place	in	1848	in	Saint	Petersburg	during	
the	White	Nights	festival,	a	time	of	year	in	early	summer	where	the	sun	never	sets	
completely,	each	chapter	or	section	describing	the	events	of	one	night.	The	last	
novel	to	be	addressed	in	this	analysis	is	John	Green’s	Paper	Towns.	This	book	is	a	
philosophical	questioning	of	the	pressures	society	puts	on	its	subjects	to	fit	into	a	
single	predetermined	version	of	success,	disguised	as	a	young	adult	novel	about	
high	school.	It	takes	place	around	fictional	Jefferson	Park,	a	suburb	outside	of	
Orlando,	and	was	published	in	2008.	Paper	Towns	tells	the	story	of	high	school	
senior	Quentin	(Q)	Jacobsen	and	the	adventures	he	has	with	his	friends,	filled	with	
both	silliness	and	mortality,	as	they	try	to	find	Margo	Roth	Spiegleman:	Q’s	
childhood	friend,	lifelong	unrequited	love,	and	a	classic	example	of	the	“Manic	Pixie	
Dreamgirl”	trope.		
I	have	chosen	these	works	not	because	they	have	undiscovered	meanings	or	
connections	under	the	surface	of	the	text.	I	chose	these	specific	works	because	of	
their	variety	in	genres,	audiences,	and	origins	to	show	the	continued	relevance	of	
nomadic	analysis	in	a	variety	of	contexts	and	for	their	subject	matter	as	they	directly	
and	indirectly	address	the	idea	of	happiness.	The	analysis	of	these	works	will	be	
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both	a	demonstration	of	what	it	means	to	read	through	a	Deleuzian	lens	in	2020	and	
an	attempt	to	reach	a	greater	understanding	of	how	hope,	freedom,	and	happiness	
are	produced	through	lines	of	flight.	While	the	construction	of	these	works	varies	
drastically,	each	author	has	elements	of	nomad	thought	in	their	writing	style	and	
references	to	concepts	derivative	of	flight	lines	and	the	rhizome	in	their	content.	
Anne	of	Green	Gables	frequently	draws	on	a	symbolic	idea	of	the	winding	path	of	life	
itself	in	a	way	that	reflects	Deleuze	and	Guattari’s	ideas	of	the	line	of	flight.	White	
Nights	ends	with	an	ambiguous	question	as	the	last	line,	inviting	nomadic	analysis	of	
the	text	as	a	machine	to	produce	a	meaning	for	the	ending	and	thereby	of	the	entire	
story.	Paper	Towns	has	frequent	significant	plot	points	about	maps	and	traveling	
between	places	to	escape	the	structure	of	society,	which	can	be	used	as	an	example	
of	Deleuzian	deterritorialization.	Each	of	these	texts	can	produce	a	multitude	of	
other	meanings	beyond	these	preliminary	examples	when	looked	at	through	the	
lens	of	other	philosophical	concepts,	but	with	this	analysis	I	will	focus	specifically	on	
what	these	meanings	come	to	say	about	how	hope	functions	in	individual	lives	and	
what	defines	freedom	and	happiness	and	how	or	whether	any	of	it	is	truly	possible.			
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Answering	the	Question	
(a).		 Anne	of	Green	Gables	presents	a	version	of	life	in	which	the	production	of	true	
happiness,	hope,	and	freedom	is	inevitable.	The	story	begins	as	orphaned	Anne	
Shirley	is	mistakenly	sent	to	live	with	brother	and	sister	Mathew	and	Marilla	
Cuthbert,	who	had	intended	to	adopt	an	orphan	boy	to	help	with	farm	work.	Anne’s	
unashamed	wonder	at	the	world	and	unbridled	enthusiasm	convince	the	Cuthberts	
to	keep	her	anyway	as	they	reluctantly	realize	the	much-needed	joy	she	brings	to	
their	lives.	She	is	judged	by	the	adults	of	the	town	for	her	talkativeness	and	fanciful	
imagination,	and	her	adventurous	spirit	gets	her	into	trouble	numerous	times,	as	
she	nearly	drowns	on	a	raft	while	reenacting	a	play	and	accidentally	gets	her	friend	
and	neighbor,	Diana	Barry,	drunk	on	currant	wine	while	hosting	a	tea	party.	Anne	
excels	in	school,	partially	spurred	on	by	her	hatred	for	fellow	classmate	and	future	
love	interest,	Gilbert	Blythe.	At	age	16,	she	moves	away	to	the	city	to	get	her	
teaching	license	at	the	Queen’s	Academy	and	at	the	end	of	the	year,	is	awarded	a	
scholarship	to	pursue	a	bachelor’s	degree,	but	her	dreamy	childhood	comes	to	an	
abrupt	end	when	Mathew	dies	of	a	heart	attack.	Anne	abandons	her	studies	to	move	
back	home	with	Marilla	and	finally	makes	peace	with	Gilbert	when	he	gives	up	his	
teaching	position	there	so	that	Anne	can	work	close	to	home.		
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Anne’s	boundless	imagination	is	finally	reigned	in	towards	reality	at	the	end	
of	the	book,	but	her	optimism	is	not.	Throughout	the	story,	the	constant	hardship	
Anne	experiences	as	an	outcast	and	an	orphan	does	not	change	her	positive	outlook	
on	life,	and	even	with	Mathew’s	death,	she	finds	a	way	to	hold	onto	hope.	Near	the	
end	of	the	novel,	Anne	says,	“my	future	seemed	to	stretch	out	before	me	like	a	
straight	road.	I	thought	I	could	see	along	it	for	many	a	milestone.	Now	there	is	a	
bend	in	it.	I	don't	know	what	lies	around	the	bend,	but	I'm	going	to	believe	that	the	
best	does.	It	has	a	fascination	of	its	own,	that	bend”	(Montgomery,	420-421).	This	
bend	in	the	road	represents	the	first	new	concept	produced:	hope,	as	defined	as	the	
moment	of	deterritorialization,	and	this	is	the	way	Anne	is	able	to	find	happiness	in	
her	constantly	re-territorialized	life.	
As	a	poor	female	orphan	in	rural	Avonlea	village	in	Canada	in	1908,	society	
does	not	allow	for	many	potentials	for	Anne.	Even	in	her	childhood,	she	is	constantly	
taught	the	proper	way	to	act	at	home	by	Marilla,	at	school	by	a	slew	of	uninspiring	
teachers,	and	at	church	by	both	the	religious	figureheads	and	all	of	the	judgmental	
society	ladies	in	attendance.	Anne	is	always	being	criticized	by	society	for	her	
temper,	flighty	imagination,	and	constant	wonder	at	the	world	that	sets	her	apart	
from	the	rest	of	the	proper	subjects,	which	is	all	symbolized	by	her	red	hair.	
Montgomery	writes	of	Anne’s	first	introduction	to	Mrs.	Lynde,	who	represents	
Avonlea	society,	“Anne	came	running	in	presently,	her	face	sparkling	with	delight	of	
her	orchard	rovings;	but	abashed	at	finding	herself	in	the	unexpected	presence	of	a	
stranger,	she	halted	confusedly	inside	the	door	[	.	.	.	]	the	wind	had	ruffled	her	
hatless	hair	into	an	over-brilliant	disorder;	it	had	never	looked	redder	than	at	that	
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moment”	(89).	This	example	is	a	literal	moment	of	territorialization	for	Anne,	where	
her	boundless	flight	potential	is	suddenly	and	harshly	captured.	Yet	despite	all	this	
persistent	re-territorialization,	Anne	remains	her	creative,	imaginative,	and	
wondrous	self;	a	true	line	of	flight.	
Anne’s	flight	line	started	out	entirely	deterritorialized	as	an	orphan,	so	
throughout	her	life,	she	always	has	a	surplus	of	potential	happiness	within.	Even	
with	all	of	the	hardships	and	suffering	she	endures,	the	pure	fact	of	her	
placelessness	at	the	beginning	gives	her	the	ability	to	move	between	places	for	the	
rest	of	her	life.	Anne	came	to	learn	that	wherever	she	ends	up	will	not	be	good,	so	
she	found	a	way	to	create	joy	in	the	traveling	between.	She	says,	“I	am	not	going	to	
think	about	going	back	to	the	asylum	while	we’re	having	our	drive.	I’m	just	going	to	
think	about	the	drive”	(52).	When	the	metaphorical	and	literal	drive	is	over,	Anne’s	
imagination	becomes	her	tool	to	deal	with	her	reality,	but	it	is	not	an	escape	from	
reality.	Not	every	situation	has	this	potential,	what	Anne	calls	“scope	for	
imagination”:	“there’s	so	much	scope	for	imagination	in	a	wind”	(106),	“there’s	no	
scope	for	imagination	in	patchwork.	It's	just	one	little	seam	after	another	and	you	
never	seem	to	be	getting	anywhere”	(126).	Anne	can’t	imagine	her	territorialization	
and	repression	away,	so	instead,	she	uses	imagination	to	live	more	fully	within	the	
boundaries	she	has.	It	is	an	accentuating	of	reality,	a	way	of	making	reality	more	real	
and	more	hers,	and	another	way	of	deterritorializing	within	the	territorialized.	
Anne	renames	many	things	in	her	life,	which	is	representative	of	this	
accentuating	and	deterritorializing	reality.	A	patch	of	flowers	in	the	woods	behind	
Green	Gables	becomes	“Violet	Vale.”	The	stretch	of	road	that	runs	between	a	row	of	
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apple	trees	is	“the	White	Way	of	Delight.”	She	calls	a	small	pond	by	another	
farmhouse	“the	Lake	of	Shining	Waters.”	She	even	renames	herself	Cordelia	
Fitzgerald	or	Rosamond	Montmorency	or	other	more	“romantic”	names.	While	these	
imaginings	are	only	the	fancies	of	a	young	girl	who	has	experienced	more	than	her	
fair	share	of	suffering,	they	are	also	her	way	of	finding	joy	in	her	life	and	constantly	
producing	hope	for	herself	for	a	better	version	of	reality;	they	are	not	totally	
imagined	spaces,	it	is	renaming	real	places	and	things	to	match	the	hopeful	way	in	
which	Anne	views	them.	Anne	says	about	her	“White	Way	of	Delight,”	“it’s	the	first	
thing	I	ever	saw	that	couldn’t	be	improved	upon	by	imagination”	(26).	Her	
imagination	is	not	what	removes	her	from	her	world	as	the	adults	around	her	all	
believe,	but	instead	is	what	allows	her	boundless	potential	to	continue	moving	
within	her	world.		
The	Deleuzian	concept	of	becoming	is	what	enables	Anne’s	movement	and	is	
also	represented	by	Anne’s	renaming	of	things.	“Becoming	is	a	rhizome,	not	a	
classificatory	or	genealogical	tree.	Becoming	is	certainly	not	imitating,	or	identifying	
with	something	[	.	.	.	]	Becoming	is	a	verb	with	a	consistency	all	its	own;	it	does	not	
reduce	to,	or	lead	back	to,	‘appearing,’	‘being,’	‘equaling,’	or	‘producing’”	(1987,	239).	
The	“White	Way	of	Delight”	is	not	just	a	name	to	Anne,	it	is	a	real	place	that	
produces	real	affect	for	her.	A	reflection	in	a	mirror	and	an	echo	on	a	hill	become	
Anne’s	friends.	She	doesn’t	just	enjoy	nature	and	the	world;	she	becomes	acquainted	
with	them:	“Can	I	take	the	apple	blossoms	with	me	for	company?”	(Montgomery,	
83).	Her	imaginings	produce	the	real	world	she	lives	in.	“Now	I’m	going	to	imagine	
things	into	this	room	so	they’ll	always	stay	imagined”	(84).	Anne	becomes	a	seagull,	
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a	bumblebee,	the	wind.	Her	life	around	her	becomes	what	she	imagines	it	to	be,	not	
just	by	pretending	things	are	better	than	they	are,	but	by	creating	them	in	the	real	
world	in	the	way	that	she	perceives	them	based	on	the	affect	they	produce	for	her.	
Even	when	Anne	is	unhappy,	she	finds	a	delight	in	it	too,	not	because	she	has	
no	deep	emotions	but	because	she	enjoys	the	completeness	of	her	human	
experience.	One	of	these	first	moments	is	when	Anne	loses	her	temper	with	Mrs.	
Lynde	for	criticizing	her	red	hair	in	the	moment	of	literal	territorialization	
mentioned	previously.	Marilla	tells	her	she	must	apologize,	and	at	first	Anne	refuses	
and	shuts	herself	up	in	her	room,	resigning	herself	to	a	life	of	imprisonment	and	
martyrdom,	as	angry	children	are	wont	to	do.	Partially	inspired	by	Matthew’s	
encouragement,	she	has	a	change	of	heart	and	decides	to	apologize,	completely	and	
earnestly,	to	the	best	of	her	performative	abilities.	“There	was	no	mistaking	her	
sincerity—it	breathed	in	every	tone	of	her	voice.	Both	Marilla	and	Mrs.	Lynde	
recognized	its	unmistakable	ring.	But	the	former	understood	in	dismay	that	Anne	
was	actually	enjoying	her	valley	of	humiliation—was	revelling	in	the	thoroughness	
of	her	abasement”	(101).	This	scene	is	intended	to	be	a	humorous	anecdote	about	
Anne’s	childishly	over-dramatic	way	of	dealing	with	problems	in	her	life,	but	it	is	
actually	a	demonstration	of	her	maturity	in	understanding	the	suffering	of	her	life	
and	her	ability	to	accept	it.	This	is	the	new	happiness	Anne	is	able	to	find,	a	
happiness	within	the	confines	of	her	subjectivity,	which,	combined	with	her	hope	in	
the	moments	of	deterritorialization	in	her	territorialized	life,	allows	Anne	to	
experience	every	part	of	reality	without	feeling	broken	and	burdened	by	it.		
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She	is	never	a	perfect	example	of	the	proper	subjectivity	society	lays	out	for	
her,	so	she	never	has	to	be	just	any	one	kind	of	subject.	She	is	able	to	imagine	herself	
into	an	infinite	number	of	fantasy	worlds	and	subjectivities,	so	she	is	always	able	to	
hold	onto	hope	for	that	next	moment	of	deterritorialization	and	freedom	before	she	
is	re-territorialized	again.	Anne	can	exist	in	all	of	these	subjectivities	more	
comfortably,	too,	because	she	doesn’t	fit	in	any	one	of	them.	“There’s	such	a	lot	of	
different	Annes	in	me.	If	I	was	just	the	one	Anne	it	would	be	ever	so	much	more	
comfortable,	but	then	it	wouldn’t	be	half	so	interesting”	(224).	Her	multiplicity	of	
selves	better	equips	her	to	deal	with	the	constant	re-territorialization	she	faces	and	
eventually	teaches	her	to	territorialize	herself.	“Anne	sighed	and,	dragging	her	eyes	
from	the	witcheries	of	the	spring	world,	the	beckoning	day	of	breeze	and	blue,	and	
the	green	things	upspringing	in	the	garden,	buried	herself	resolutely	in	her	book.	
There	would	be	other	springs”	(355).	At	this	moment,	Anne	is	literally	re-
territorializing	herself	while	still	being	acutely	aware	of	what	is	outside	her	current	
subjectivity.	She	learns	to	exist	both	inside	and	outside	her	roles	in	society	and	so	
finds	a	new	happiness	in	all	of	her	subjectivities	because	of	her	potential	
deterritorialization	from	them.	The	coming	of	a	new	spring	is	the	moment	of	hope,	
departure,	and	growth,	literally	through	the	roots	of	the	plants	forming	rhizomes	
that	allow	for	expansion	by	lines	of	flight;	it	is	still	not	a	symbol,	but	a	physical	
example	of	the	meta	phenomenon	that	occurs	in	Anne’s	life.	She	does	not	get	to	
experience	every	potential,	but	she	is	aware	that	there	will	always	be	new	moments	
of	hope	in	deterritorialization	that	can	only	occur	in	the	growth	of	spring	after	the	
re-territorialization	of	societal	responsibilities	in	winter.	
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This	connects	back	again	to	the	potential	of	the	bend	in	the	road.	“Anne’s	
horizons	had	closed	in	[	.	.	.	]	but	if	the	path	set	before	her	feet	was	to	be	narrow	she	
knew	that	flowers	of	quiet	happiness	would	bloom	along	it	[	.	.	.	]	nothing	could	rob	
her	of	her	birthright	of	fancy	or	her	ideal	world	of	dreams.	And	there	was	always	
that	bend	in	the	road!”	(427).	Anne	sees	the	bigger	picture	of	the	rhizome	of	her	life	
overall	and	the	many	lines	of	flight	that	compose	it,	without	imposing	a	societal	
construct	of	the	path	it	is	supposed	to	take.	Unlike	the	rest	of	the	characters	in	the	
story,	Anne	has	hope	without	expectations	and	enjoys	the	process	of	the	
anticipation	itself.	Marilla	tells	her,	“you	set	your	heart	too	much	on	things	[	.	.	.	]	I’m	
afraid	there’ll	be	a	great	many	disappointments	in	store	for	you	through	life.”	Anne’s	
response	is,	“looking	forward	to	things	is	half	the	pleasure	of	them	[	.	.	.	]	You	mayn’t	
get	the	things	themselves;	but	nothing	can	prevent	you	from	having	the	fun	of	
looking	forward	to	them”	(129).	Anne	already	has	experienced	many	
disappointments	in	her	life,	and	her	line	of	flight	has	been	recaptured	again	and	
again	by	the	circumstances	of	society	around	her,	but	the	recapture	of	a	line	of	flight	
is	not	hopeless;	it	is	the	definition	of	hope	itself.	Without	obstacles	in	the	way,	a	line	
of	flight	never	forms	the	full	rhizome	of	a	new	happiness.	Those	obstacles,	or	bends	
in	the	road,	give	shape	to	a	life,	and	Anne	sees	that	despite	her	imaginative	youth	
and	innocence.	It	is	precisely	this	imagination	that	gives	her	the	ability	to	see	her	life	
for	all	that	it	is	and	all	that	it	can	be	simultaneously	at	the	same	time,	and	this	is	
what	allows	her	to	find	a	new	happiness	and	hope,	even	though	she	is	never	free.	
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(b).		 The	next	story,	White	Nights,	is	productive	in	a	different	way,	producing	a	
new	concept	of	freedom	not	by	using	the	characters	as	a	model	for	how	this	is	
achieved,	but	because	none	of	them	ever	truly	reach	the	freedom	they	believe	they	
want.	The	main	character/narrator	calls	himself	a	dreamer	and	describes	his	
reclusive	life	apart	from	society,	living	only	through	his	imagination.		
The	dreamer—if	you	want	an	exact	definition—is	not	a	human	being,	but	a	
creature	of	an	immediate	sort.	For	the	most	part	he	settles	in	some	
inaccessible	corner,	as	though	hiding	from	the	light	of	day	[	.	.	.	]	He	is	rich	
now	with	his	own	individual	life;	he	has	suddenly	become	rich,	and	it	is	not	
for	nothing	that	the	fading	sunset	sheds	its	farewell	gleams	so	gaily	before	
him,	and	calls	forth	a	swarm	of	impressions	from	his	warmed	heart	[	.	.	.	]	And	
it	is	only	after	the	queer	fellow	has	returned	to	his	comfortable	den	with	
fresh	stores	for	his	mind	to	work	on	[	.	.	.	]	It	has	grown	dark	in	the	room;	his	
soul	is	sad	and	empty;	the	whole	kingdom	of	fancies	drops	to	pieces	about	
him	(Dostoyevsky,	12-14).	
He	sees	himself	as	this	cosmopolitan	subject,	wandering	the	streets	alone,	imagining	
connections	he	makes	with	the	strangers	he	passes,	and	living	through	these	
imagined	connections	while	hiding	from	society,	but	never	truly	achieving	
happiness	because	reality	always	sets	back	in.	In	this	way,	the	Dreamer	represents	a	
false	line	of	flight	and	a	false	freedom,	one	that	always	already	captures	itself	
because	there	was	never	any	potential	in	the	flight	to	begin	with.	
	 At	the	beginning	of	the	story,	the	Dreamer	describes	his	solitary	wanderings	
throughout	the	city.	He	knows	no	one	but	feels	connected	to	the	people	he	passes	
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every	day	and	is	comforted	by	the	familiarity	of	the	streets	and	buildings,	even	
though	he	feels	as	though	his	life	has	no	purpose	or	meaning.	These	wandering	form	
a	rhizome,	a	pattern	without	a	pattern,	an	assemblage	of	lines	of	flight	that	have	
been	captured	and	then	deterritorialized	again.	He	believes	that	living	this	life	
makes	him	free,	and	he	believes	he	wants	this	freedom,	if	only	he	had	someone	to	
share	it	with.	However,	when	he	gets	that	opportunity	and	makes	a	real	human	
connection,	he	bases	his	happiness	not	on	the	ability	of	the	flight	lines	of	two	people	
to	form	this	cosmopolitan	rhizome	side	by	side,	but	by	his	ability	to	capture	another	
line	of	flight.		
That	other	line	of	flight	is	Nastenka,	who	will	become	the	love	interest	for	the	
story.	He	meets	her	on	the	first	night	by	saving	her	from	the	unwanted	advances	of	a	
drunk	man	who	is	also	wandering	the	streets	at	night.	The	Dreamer	confesses	that	
he	has	always	dreamed	of	speaking	to	a	beautiful	woman	like	her	but	never	has	
before	and	feels	quite	timid,	which	Nastenka	finds	appealing	in	contrast	to	the	
brashness	of	other	men,	but	she	makes	him	promise	that	he	won’t	fall	in	love	with	
her.	On	the	second	night,	Nastenka	asks	the	Dreamer	to	tell	her	about	himself,	but	he	
contends	that	he	has	no	history	since	he	has	spent	his	whole	life	alone	and	instead	
explains	who	he	is	as	the	Dreamer.	Nastenka	then	tells	her	story:	how	she	grew	up	
with	her	strict	grandmother,	never	being	able	to	see	the	world	until	the	handsome	
new	lodger	in	their	spare	room	takes	her	out	to	the	theatre	and	she	falls	in	love.	The	
lodger	tells	Nastenka	that	he	can’t	marry	her	because	he	doesn’t	have	enough	
money	but	promises	to	return	in	a	year,	but	the	year	has	now	gone	by	without	any	
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word	from	the	lodger,	and	Nastenka	has	fallen	into	despair	until	she	meets	the	
Dreamer.		
Nastenka	is	a	line	of	flight	in	the	story.	She	is	constantly	re-territorialized	as	a	
woman	but	never	loses	hope	in	her	ability	to	find	happiness	within	that	life	anyway.	
She	believes	that	she	has	found	a	friend	in	the	Dreamer,	someone	she	can	be	herself	
with	and	someone	who	will	not	territorialize	her	as	a	woman,	only	seeing	her	for	
her	value	as	a	sexual	object.	The	Dreamer	believes	at	first	that	this	is	what	he	wants	
too.	He	tells	her,	“in	two	minutes	you	have	made	me	happy	forever.	Yes,	happy;	who	
knows,	perhaps,	you	have	reconciled	me	with	myself,	solved	my	doubts!”	(10).	In	
reality,	however,	he	is	not	in	the	subjectivity	in	which	he	sees	himself,	as	a	helpless	
line	of	flight	being	captured	by	society;	he	represents	the	society	that	constantly	
captures	the	flight	lines	of	women.	It	isn’t	until	the	second	night	that	he	even	asks	
her	name	because	“it	never	entered	my	head,	I	felt	quite	happy	as	it	was…”	(12).	
This	shows	that	he	clearly	does	not	see	her	as	a	person	but	just	as	an	ideal.	By	the	
third	night,	despite	his	promise,	the	Dreamer	has	fallen	in	love	with	Nastenka,	or	
who	she	is	in	his	head,	but	in	order	to	preserve	his	first	connection	with	another	
human,	or	in	order	to	maintain	his	control	over	her,	he	hides	his	feelings	and	helps	
Nastenka	write	a	letter	to	the	lodger.	Nastenka	tells	the	Dreamer	that	she	loves	him	
because	he	hasn’t	fallen	in	love	with	her,	because	he	is	the	first	man	to	treat	her	like	
a	human	and	not	just	an	object,	which	then	begins	to	make	the	Dreamer	feel	
alienated	from	her	after	all,	since	he	does	truly	see	her	as	an	object	to	capture	and	
possess.	At	the	end	of	the	night,	Nastenka	“flew	like	an	arrow	down	her	side	street.	
[The	Dreamer]	stood	still	for	a	long	time	following	her	with	[his]	eyes”	(25).	Only	
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Nastenka	is	a	line	in	flight;	The	Dreamer	is	not	going	anywhere,	despite	his	constant	
rovings,	and	has	set	his	future	on	a	material	goal	of	attainment	by	territorialization	
rather	than	the	motion	made	possible	in	deterritorialization.		
The	fourth	night	is	when	the	story	comes	to	its	climax.	Nastenka	is	
heartbroken	again	that	the	lodger	has	not	contacted	her,	and	the	Dreamer	tries	to	
comfort	her,	eventually	giving	in	and	confessing	his	feelings	for	her.	He	says	his	
unrequited	love	is	too	painful	to	remain	friends,	but	Nastenka	convinces	him	to	stay,	
“if	you	do	not	want	to	leave	me	alone	to	my	fate,	without	hope,	without	
consolation—if	you	are	ready	to	love	me	always	as	you	do	now”	(33).	She	still	
believes	in	the	potentialities	of	her	own	line	of	flight	and	sees	the	Dreamer	for	the	
deterritorialized	subject	he	believes	himself	to	be,	so	there	is	still	a	hope	for	
Nastenka	for	a	new	kind	of	freedom	with	the	Dreamer.	Nastenka	is	ready	to	give	up	
on	the	lodger,	but	when	he	suddenly	shows	up	on	the	street	where	they	are	walking.	
Nastenka	runs	back	to	him,	leaving	the	Dreamer	alone	again	at	last.		
The	final	section	of	the	story	describes	the	morning	after.	The	Dreamer	reads	
a	letter	Nastenka	sent	him,	apologizing	for	hurting	him	and	inviting	him	to	her	
wedding	with	the	lodger.	The	Dreamer	doesn’t	want	to	resent	her	for	her	happiness	
but	begins	to	see	the	world	in	grey	as	he	resigns	himself	to	be	alone	forever.	His	life	
seems	much	bleaker	without	his	imagination	to	take	him	out	of	the	real	world	or	his	
ability	to	participate	in	the	real	world	by	using	his	masculine	power	to	capture	
another	subject	in	marriage,	but	the	story	ends	with	a	question:	“a	whole	moment	of	
happiness!	Is	that	too	little	for	the	whole	of	a	man’s	life?”	(37).		
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This	question	refers	to	the	fates	of	both	Nastenka	and	the	Dreamer	and	
whether	either	of	them	attained	true	happiness,	hope,	or	freedom.	Nastenka	has	
only	ever	existed	as	a	trapped	female	subject	in	bourgeois	society.	She	experienced	
one	moment	of	deterritorialization	with	the	Dreamer	in	the	middle	of	the	story,	but	
she	ends	recaptured,	although	perhaps	with	the	possibility	for	a	new	happiness	
again.	As	a	true	line	of	flight,	she	does	not	have	a	direction	or	autonomy	for	herself;	
returning	to	the	lodger	rather	than	staying	with	the	Dreamer	was	just	one	of	many	
possible	ways	she	could	be	re-territorialized,	but	it	does	not	matter	who	she	ends	up	
with	because	as	a	true	line	of	flight	she	will	always	hold	onto	that	hope	for	a	
moment	of	deterritorialization	and	live	within	the	new	happiness	of	that	potential,	
even	though	she	is	not	free.	
The	Dreamer,	on	the	other	hand,	has	never	been	territorialized,	but	the	
freedom	he	experiences	is	not	truly	free.	He	bases	his	real	happiness	on	his	
masculine	power	to	get	married	and	participate	in	society	to	the	full	extent	of	his	
subjectivity,	not	on	the	potentialities	of	his	flight	lines	to	move	between	and	outside	
of	subjectivities.	The	Dreamer	is	not	free	at	all,	because	the	freedom	he	believes	he	
is	living	is	all	within	his	comfortable	bourgeoisie	subjectivity.	It	is	briefly	mentioned	
that	he	does	have	some	sort	of	job,	but	he	spends	most	of	his	time	wandering	the	
streets	of	St.	Petersburg.	He	imagines	he	connects	with	the	people	he	passes	in	his	
wanderings,	but	those	connections	are	only	about	himself	in	his	own	imagination	
and	not	about	relating	to	and	understanding	the	other	subjects	of	society,	so	he	is	
not	a	true	cosmopolitan	like	he	believes	either.	He	owns	a	house	and	has	a	maid	who	
cooks	and	cleans	for	him,	so	he	has	all	the	financial	freedom	to	go	anywhere	and	
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escape	it	all,	but	instead,	he	continues	along	with	his	life	as	usual	because	he	does	
actually	enjoy	the	comfort	of	material	things.		
The	Dreamer	wants	to	be	territorialized,	only	imagining	that	his	flight	lines	
bring	him	hope	and	freedom,	when	it	is	really	this	imagination	that	is	preventing	
him	from	feeling	real	hope	or	being	truly	free.	“His	imagination	is	again	stirred	and	
at	work,	and	again	a	new	world,	a	new	fascinating	life	opens	vistas	before	him.	A	
fresh	dream—fresh	happiness!”	(15),	but	this	fresh	happiness	is	not	real	or	lasting	
because	it	is	entirely	contrary	to	reality,	rather	than	built	upon	it,	and	it	prevents	the	
Dreamer	from	taking	action	in	his	life,	instead	of	being	the	tool	that	opens	up	his	
potentialities.	He	imagines	himself	out	of	reality	entirely	which	means	he	can’t	have	
hope—the	moment	of	deterritorialization—if	he’s	never	been	territorialized	in	the	
first	place.	Furthermore,	the	version	of	freedom	that	he	thinks	he	is	living	doesn’t	
bring	him	happiness	anyway.	It	is	the	possibility	of	territorialization	that	does	this,	
as	represented	by	his	love	for	Nastenka	and	his	ability	to	territorialize	her,	because	
you	need	to	have	territorialization	to	have	hope,	and	that	is	where	freedom	can	
arise.	Because	the	Dreamer	believes	he	is	a	free	line	of	flight	when	he	is	actually	
comfortable	in	his	bourgeoisie	subjectivity,	because	he	believes	he	wants	
deterritorialization	instead	of	finding	the	moments	of	hope	within	a	territorialized	
society,	and	because	he	bases	his	happiness	on	this	territorialization	of	another	line	
of	flight	instead	of	the	rhizomatic	movements	of	both	lines,	he	does	not	have	real	
hope,	he	does	not	recognize	his	potentials	for	real	freedom,	and	he	does	not	
experience	a	new	happiness,	even	in	that	one	moment	of	connection	with	Nastenka.		
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(c).	 The	last	story,	Paper	Towns,	is	somewhat	of	a	combination	of	both	works	
discussed	thus	far.	There	are	two	main	characters	in	the	book,	Margo	and	Q:	
childhood	friends	who	have	grown	up	and	grown	apart	in	high	school.	The	story	
begins	when	Margo	suddenly	jumps	back	into	Q’s	life,	literally	jumping	into	his	
bedroom	window	at	night	to	rope	him	into	her	elaborate	revenge	plan	against	those	
she	feels	has	wronged	her	throughout	their	high	school	experience.	Margo	starts	out	
as	a	captured	line	of	flight,	fed	up	with	the	typical	suburban	life	she’s	trapped	in.	She	
tells	Q,	“It’s	a	paper	town	[	.	.	.	]	all	those	cul-de-sacs,	those	streets	that	turn	in	on	
themselves,	all	the	houses	that	were	built	to	fall	apart.	All	those	people	living	in	their	
paper	houses,	burning	the	future	to	stay	warm”	(Green,	57).	This	night	was	Margo’s	
attempt	to	break	away	from	that,	to	do	something	that	really	matters,	even	if	that	
something	is	only	breaking	into	SeaWorld	just	to	say	you’ve	done	it.	Margo	admits	
that	the	pleasure	isn’t	really	in	doing	anything,	but	in	planning	it;	the	planning	is	
where	the	actual	moment	of	deterritorialization—hope—takes	place,	the	moment	of	
departure	of	a	line	of	flight	from	its	captured	course.		
Q,	on	the	other	hand,	likes	the	routine	and	simplicity	of	his	life,	although	he	
admits	that	he	wished	he	didn’t.	He	is	not	only	accepting	but	actively	willing	to	buy	
into	what	Margo	calls	a	paper	life,	where	“every	moment	of	your	life	is	lived	for	the	
future—you	go	to	high	school	so	you	can	go	to	college	so	you	can	get	a	good	job	so	
you	can	get	a	nice	house	so	you	can	afford	to	send	your	kids	to	college	so	they	can	
get	a	good	job	so	they	can	get	a	nice	house	so	they	can	afford	to	send	their	kids	to	
college”	(33-34),	but	Margo	shows	him	a	different	version	of	life	that	he	is	drawn	to	
as	well	in	that	night	of	shenanigans.	Margo	doesn’t	just	show	Q	how	to	have	fun	like	
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in	a	typical	high	school	narrative;	she	shows	Q	the	outside,	and	from	that	moment	
on,	Q	has	the	potential	to	become	a	line	of	flight	himself.	Even	so,	at	the	end	of	the	
night,	he	comes	to	the	conclusion	that	“the	pleasure	for	me	wasn’t	planning	or	doing	
or	leaving;	the	pleasure	was	in	seeing	our	strings	cross	and	separate	and	then	come	
back	together”	(78).	Q	wonders	if	everything	will	go	back	to	normal	the	next	
morning,	or	if	Margo	will	leave	her	clique	of	the	popular	people	to	hang	out	with	Q	
and	the	band	geeks.	He	saw	their	lines	come	back	together	that	night	and	wants	
them	to	stay	that	way.	Instead,	Margo	disappears.	Q	is	confused	and	infuriated	that	
even	the	police	blow	off	her	disappearance	as	just	another	unhappy	legal	adult	
finally	going	off	on	her	own,	so	when	Q	finds	a	clue	that	she	left	for	him,	he	decides	
to	find	her	himself.		
Q’s	search	leads	him	to	derelict	strip	malls	and	subdivisions	that	were	
abandoned	before	they	even	began,	dubbed	“paper	towns.”	The	clues	he	finds	are	
abstract,	references	to	Walt	Whitman	poetry	and	song	lyrics.	He	begins	to	believe	
that	she	committed	suicide	and	the	clues	she	left	are	just	leading	him	to	her	body,	or	
that	she	didn’t	really	want	to	be	found	at	all.	“I	had	my	hopes:	maybe	Margo	needed	
to	see	my	confidence,	maybe	this	time	she	wanted	to	be	found,	and	to	be	found	by	
me”	(115).	He	realizes	in	his	search	that	he	had	only	ever	seen	the	version	of	Margo	
that	he	had	idealized	in	his	mind,	and	he	realizes	that	she	is	a	real	person	living	her	
life	and	not	just	a	prize	to	be	won.	Q’s	dedication	to	his	search	makes	him	skip	
events	that	ought	to	be	defining	moments	of	his	high	school	life	because	his	search	
for	Margo	has	shown	him	the	futility	of	those	societal	markers	of	progress,	and	he	
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ends	up	spending	prom	night	in	the	abandoned	strip	mall	where	Margo	used	to	
write	her	plans,	trying	to	understand	who	she	is	or	was.		
It	made	me	think	about	all	the	ways	I’d	mis-seen	Margo.	There	was	no	
shortage	of	ways	to	see	her.	I’d	been	focused	on	what	had	become	of	her,	but	
now	with	my	head	trying	to	understand	the	multiplicity	of	grass	[	.	.	.	]	I	
realized	that	the	most	important	question	was	who	I	was	looking	for.	If	“What	
is	the	grass?”	has	such	a	complicated	answer,	I	thought,	so,	too,	must	“Who	is	
Margo	Roth	Spiegelman?”	Like	a	metaphor	rendered	incomprehensible	by	its	
ubiquity,	there	was	room	enough	in	what	she	had	left	me	for	an	infinite	set	of	
Margos.	(173).	
Q	finally	sees	Margo	as	this	infinite	line	of	flight,	running	away	not	just	so	she	can	be	
found	again	but	because	she	has	unlimited	potential	for	where	she	can	go,	but	this	
realization	does	not	make	Q	any	less	determined	to	find	her	anyway.	
	 With	his	new	view	of	Margo	as	a	line,	rather	than	just	one	point,	Q	sets	out	to	
find	the	points	where	she	has	been	to	try	to	trace	a	line	on	a	map	of	where	she	is	
going.	Q	and	his	friends	plan	out	possible	routes	she	could	be	taking	based	on	a	
handful	of	brochures	for	tourist	destinations	that	they	believe	belonged	to	her,	but	
none	of	these	touristy	road	trips	seem	to	fit	the	Margo	they	know.	This	is	because	
“the	rhizome	is	altogether	different,	a	map	and	not	a	tracing”	(1987,	12).	There	is	no	
line	they	can	trace	to	find	Margo,	metaphorically	or	literally:	they	can	find	the	points	
where	she	is	territorialized,	but	they	can’t	draw	a	map	of	all	of	her	because	she	is	a	
constantly	escaping	line	of	flight	forming	the	map	in	the	process.	Q	realizes	then	that	
he	will	never	be	able	to	understand	who	she	is,	only	who	she	was,	because	he	can	
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follow	her	lines,	but	he	is	always	behind,	and	she	is	always	already	somewhere	else,	
and	the	tracing	of	the	map	produces	an	entirely	different	meaning	than	that	of	the	
map	itself.	Yet	“do	not	even	lines	of	flight,	due	to	their	eventual	divergence,	
reproduce	the	very	formations	their	function	was	to	dismantle	or	outflank?”	(1987,	
13).	Q’s	search	for	Margo	through	constant	directionless	lines	of	flight	rarely	brings	
him	any	closer	to	finding	the	current	Margo	either	physically	or	emotionally,	but	it	
does	open	up	his	potentials	to	live	the	same	kind	of	uncaptured	life	of	his	own	after	
becoming	so	aware	of	the	outside	to	the	life	of	territorialization	he	has	always	been	
content	with.		
	 Q	gets	as	close	to	understanding	Margo	as	he	ever	will	on	his	last	day	of	high	
school,	cleaning	out	his	locker	and	experiencing	for	the	first	time	what	it	feels	like	to	
really	leave	without	ever	coming	back:	“and	as	paralyzing	and	upsetting	as	all	the	
never	agains	were,	the	final	leaving	felt	perfect.	Pure.	The	most	distilled	possible	
form	of	liberation”	(Green,	228).	Q	finally	experiences	complete	deterritorialization	
and	finally	understands	that	Margo	did	not	just	set	up	a	wild	treasure	hunt	for	him	
to	follow	because	the	leaving	feels	too	good	to	be	looking	back	and	setting	up	tracks	
the	whole	time.	Most	of	the	clues	they	found	were	not	left	for	them	on	purpose,	and	
so	these	accidental	trails	give	the	most	accurate	glimpse	into	who	Margo	is	when	
she	isn’t	being	anyone	for	anyone	else,	and	these	moments	are	their	best	chance	at	
finding	her.	
	 On	graduation	day,	after	finding	one	last	definite	clue	that	Margo	had	never	
intended	to	be	seen,	Q	and	his	friends	go	on	a	spontaneous	road	trip	to	Agloe,	New	
York,	a	town	created	by	mapmakers	as	a	copyright	trap	that	became	real	when	
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developers	built	a	general	store	at	that	location:	a	different	kind	of	“paper	town.”	
This	paper	town	had	become	real,	and	Margo	hopes	that	this	is	where	her	paper	life	
can	become	real	too.	“The	derelict	space	is	a	zone	of	indeterminacy	that	bodies-in-
becoming	may	make	their	own”	(Massumi,	104).	Margo’s	abandoned	strip	mall	and	
this	abandoned	general	store	become	the	places	where	she	can	be	herself	and	reach	
her	potential	to	escape,	and	Margo	becomes	more	real	when	she	is	in	these	places	
and	moving	between	them,	rather	than	being	lost	and	in	need	of	rescue	to	rejoin	the	
real	world.		
This	is	why	when	they	find	Margo	here,	it	is	not	the	heartfelt	reunion	Q	was	
still	secretly	hoping	for.	He	no	longer	can	pretend	that	any	of	the	version	of	Margo	
he	had	in	his	head	was	real,	but	she	realizes	that	her	actions	do	have	real	impacts	on	
people	too,	no	matter	how	far	she	goes	to	disappear.	“Even	though	autonomous	
zones	are	derelict	spaces	that	become	sites	of	escape,	they	should	not	be	thought	of	
as	‘outside’	the	existing	structures	in	any	straightforward	sense.	Escape	always	
takes	place	in	the	World	As	We	Know	It”	(105).	Q	convinces	Margo	to	keep	in	touch	
with	her	family	even	while	she	runs	away	for	the	rest	of	her	life,	and	Margo	invites	Q	
to	join	her	as	an	outcast,	but	both	realize	that	it	would	never	work:	Q	likes	to	plant	
roots,	and	Margo	likes	to	rip	them	up.	“Leaving	feels	good	and	pure	only	when	you	
leave	something	important,	something	that	mattered	to	you.	Pulling	life	out	by	the	
roots.	But	you	can’t	do	that	until	your	life	has	grown	roots”	(Green,	234).	Q	believes	
in	planting	those	roots	for	the	future	and	existing	within	his	territorialized	life	
because	it	is	simple,	and	Margo	only	grows	her	roots	and	allows	herself	to	be	
territorialized	so	she	can	deterritorialize	herself	again.		
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Ultimately,	Q	and	his	friends	return	home	to	continue	on	their	socially	
approved	life	paths	to	college	and	careers,	and	Margo	continues	in	her	attempt	to	
avoid	all	of	that,	constantly	living	within	the	thrill	of	leaving.	Both	learn	that	life	is	
not	a	book	or	movie	to	romanticize	into	an	adventure	story	and	that	people	are	not	
who	they	are	in	your	head,	but	both	learn,	too,	that	the	only	escape	is	to	keep	going,	
and	that	human	connections	can	be	made	when	you	least	expect	it	and	will	always	
have	an	impact	on	individual	lives.	“I	can	almost	imagine	a	happiness	without	her,	
the	ability	to	let	her	go,	to	feel	our	roots	are	connected	even	if	I	never	see	that	leaf	of	
grass	again”	(274).	Q	and	Margo	both	find	their	new	happinesses	in	the	end,	
separate	but	connected	through	the	past	and	traveling	forever	in	their	own	
directionless	rhizomes,	without	relying	on	a	false	hope	for	their	lines	to	cross	again	
one	day.		
	
(d).	 Margo	is	the	truest	line	of	flight	in	any	of	the	works	discussed.	Like	Anne,	she	
is	constantly	re-territorialized,	but	unlike	Anne,	the	power	of	the	system	is	not	
enough	to	discipline	her,	and	her	flight	line	actually	reaches	its	full	potential	of	a	
total	escape.	In	some	sense,	she	will	always	be	re-territorialized	again	even	after	her	
escape,	because	“bodies	in	flight	do	not	leave	the	world	behind.	If	the	circumstances	
are	right,	they	take	the	world	with	them—into	the	future”	(Massumi,	105).	Margo	
does	need	to	get	a	job	here	and	there	to	survive	and	she	remains	in	contact	with	her	
younger	sister,	but	Margo’s	line	of	flight	will	always	have	unlimited	potential,	and	
she	can	leave	at	any	time,	flying	through	her	life	in	a	constant	state	of	
deterritorialization	by	constantly	deterritorializing	her	world	as	she	goes.	Unlike	
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Anne,	Margo	does	not	find	joy	in	the	moment	of	recapture	because	of	hope	for	the	
moment	of	escape	again.	Instead,	her	happiness	is	entirely	within	this	moment	of	
deterritorialization,	and	she	cannot	find	freedom	in	any	part	of	territorialized	life.		
Nastenka	is	essentially	the	opposite:	she	knows	her	life	only	has	the	potential	
for	more	capture,	so	she	finds	her	freedom	by	choosing	between	the	few	un-free	
choices	she	has.	Unlike	Anne,	she	was	not	free	from	the	beginning	and	therefore	did	
not	have	the	same	infinite	potential	to	be	deterritorialized	again,	but	like	Anne,	
Nastenka	experiences	much	more	severe	sexism	in	her	society	and	knows	that	
ultimate	escape	as	a	true	infinite	line	of	flight	is	impossible.	Margo	has	this	potential	
because	her	society	does	not	as	strictly	require	every	woman	to	become	an	object	
belonging	to	a	man	in	marriage,	but	instead,	Margo’s	suburban	capitalist	subjectivity	
is	the	apparatus	that	confines	her.	These	three	female	characters	in	the	works	
represent	lines	of	flight	under	varying	degrees	of	confinement	with	varying	degrees	
of	potential,	and	because	of	this,	the	methods	of	finding	hope,	the	levels	of	freedom	
discovered,	and	the	versions	of	a	new	happiness	achieved	are	different	for	each.		
For	the	male	characters,	Q	and	the	Dreamer,	territorialization	means	
something	different.	It	is	still	the	lack	of	freedom,	but	it	is	also	the	source	of	their	
power.	Q	and	the	Dreamer	both	desire	territorialization	and	fetishize	their	love	
interests	as	the	manic	pixie	dream-girl	to	capture;	“it	can	happen	in	love	that	one	
person’s	creative	line	is	the	other’s	imprisonment”	(1987,	205).	Unlike	the	Dreamer,	
however,	Q	realizes	this	and	comes	to	accept	Margo	as	a	real,	complete,	
uncapturable	human	because	he	came	to	understand	true	deterritorialization	
through	her.	He	realizes	that	he	does	not	truly	want	to	capture	her	line	of	flight	but,	
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rather,	wants	to	capture	his	own.	He	is	entirely	aware	of	the	choice	he	makes	to	re-
territorialize	himself	at	the	end	because	he	does	not	feel	an	entrapment	in	that	life,	
but	instead	a	freedom	within	the	captured	potential	itself.	This	is	because	as	middle-
class,	male,	bourgeoise	subjects,	Q	and	the	Dreamer	are	not	trapped	in	that	life.	They	
represent	the	state	apparatus	itself	in	direct	conflict	with	the	nomad	subject	that	the	
females	in	these	stories	are,	the	Dreamer	believes	himself	to	be,	and	Q	chooses	not	
to	be.		
The	Dreamer	is	an	imaginer	like	Anne,	but	he	does	not	use	imagination	to	
make	hope	out	of	reality	like	Anne.	This	is	because	he	does	not	need	to:	his	hope	and	
happiness	are	within	the	system,	so	his	imaginings	of	dreams	outside	the	system	can	
only	be	false	and	reproductive	of	the	system,	not	productive	of	the	outside.	The	
Dreamer	imagines	that	he	is	a	nomad	subject	like	Margo,	but	he	never	actually	
leaves	the	subjectivity	that	gives	him	his	power,	so	he	does	not	reach	any	
deterritorialized	potential.	As	for	Nastenka,	she	is	never	more	than	an	object	to	him,	
so	he	does	not	even	notice	the	potential	she	has	for	escape,	let	alone	notice	that	he	is	
the	one	capturing	her,	not	the	one	captured	by	his	own	subjectivity.	Q	is	like	
Nastenka	in	some	ways,	too,	both	characters	buying	into	the	system	in	order	to	
move	within	it,	but	Nastenka	never	actually	has	the	potential	to	choose	to	be	
territorialized	or	not,	whereas	Q	makes	that	choice	even	after	discovering	the	
outside.	Like	Anne,	Q	finds	happiness	within	territorialized	parts	of	life	because	of	
the	knowledge	of	the	completeness	of	it	all,	but	unlike	Anne,	his	main	pleasure	in	
deterritorialization	is	not	because	of	the	deterritorialization	itself	but	in	the	
potential	for	re-territorialization	again.	He	plants	roots	to	rip	them	up	to	be	able	to	
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plant	more	roots	again,	while	Anne	plants	roots	because	of	her	appreciation	for	the	
roots	themselves	and	rips	them	up	when	she	has	the	chance	to	experience	that	thrill	
too.		
Q	is	the	manifestation	of	every	version	of	hope,	freedom,	and	happiness,	both	
real	and	false,	and	he	is	exposed	to	all	of	the	potentials	both	inside	territorialization	
and	in	deterritorializing	itself,	but	his	life	is	not	a	model	for	the	right	way	to	
experience	any	of	it;	he	just	happened	to	be	born	into	a	subjectivity	with	the	
freedom	to	choose	not	to	be	unlimitedly	free.	This	does	not	make	him	the	villain	in	
his	story,	nor	is	the	Dreamer	the	villain	in	his,	nor	are	the	female	characters	
automatically	heroes	in	theirs.	Gender	politics	is	not	what	determines	good	and	bad,	
but	the	genders	of	these	characters	do	determine	their	individual	subjectivities,	and	
the	potentials	of	their	subjectivities	determine	the	ability	of	each	to	become	a	line	of	
flight.	Each	character	is	only	an	effect	of	their	context	that	can	produce	affect	and	
serve	as	examples	in	the	production	of	the	new	concepts	of	hope,	freedom,	and	
happiness.	
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Discussion:	What	Does	the	Question	Do?	
	 The	purpose	of	this	analysis	has	not	been	to	interpret	these	works	of	
literature,	to	emphasize	this	point	again.	The	purpose	is	to	produce	new	concepts	
that	can	be	applied	in	the	current	world	to	produce	new	meanings	in	real,	current,	
human	lives.	The	totalizing	system	of	capitalism	that	defines	those	real,	current,	
human	lives,	traps	those	who	are	impoverished	or	in	any	minority	without	any	
opportunities	to	escape.	“Modern	power	[	.	.	.	]	implies	processes	of	normalization,	
modulation,	modeling,	and	information	that	bear	on	language,	perception,	desire,	
movement,	etc.,	and	which	proceed	by	way	of	microassemblages”	(1987,	458).	In	
other	words,	modern	power	enforces	and	reproduces	itself	without	the	subject	even	
knowing	it	is	doing	so,	let	alone	knowing	how	to	escape	it.	In	“Ideology	and	
Ideological	State	Apparatuses,”	Marxist	philosopher	Louis	Althusser	describes	this	
entrapment	with	his	concept	of	interpellation.	Through	this	process,	a	subject	is	
hailed	into	their	subjectivity,	believing	it	is	by	their	choice	that	they	identify	
themselves	in	that	way,	and	therefore	acting	out	their	own	entrapment	in	that	
subjectivity.	“Ideology	has	always-already	interpellated	individuals	as	subjects,”	but	
“the	individual	is	interpellated	as	a	(free)	subject	in	order	that	he	shall	(freely)	accept	
his	subjection”		(Althusser,	302-303).	Ideological	State	Apparatuses,	such	as	the	
education	system,	cause	subjects	to	interpellate	themselves	into	captured	
subjectivities	and	territorialize	our	world	to	the	point	that	it	appears	totally	
 
 
38	
inescapable,	and	hope,	happiness,	and	freedom,	by	the	general	definitions,	seem	
impossible.	However,	the	new	definitions	of	these	concepts	are	produced	by	the	
analysis	of	literature	and	are	also	directly	produced	by	the	context	of	their	
production,	which	is	this	current	territorialized	world;	therefore,	the	new	concepts	
are	not	impossible	at	all,	but	in	fact	an	exact	condition	of	the	current	world.	
	 The	new	hope	produced	in	this	work	is	not	about	ignoring	our	reality	or	
wishing	for	the	impossible;	it’s	about	the	moment	of	deterritorialization	where	a	
line	of	flight	can	take	you	to	a	new	moment	of	territorialized	reality.	Hope	is	not	a	
resignation	to	entrapment,	it	is	a	necessary	condition	of	becoming	captured,	and	
capture	is	a	necessary	condition	of	hope.	It	is	thinking	about	the	drive,	no	matter	
where	the	drive	is	taking	you.	Constant	territorialization	of	a	flight	line	with	
potential	produces	constant	hope;	and	the	fetishization	of	a	deterritorialized	line	as	
an	object	to	hope	for	only	produces	a	false	hope	for	hope	itself.	Hope	is	different	in	
this	way	for	each	individual	person	because	the	rhizome	of	a	path	of	life	is	never	
repeatable	by	any	other	life,	but	the	process	as	the	moment	of	deterritorialization,	
the	instant	a	line	takes	flight,	produces	hope	no	matter	how	or	when	it	is	recaptured	
again.	“A	path	is	always	between	two	points,	but	the	in-between	has	taken	on	all	the	
consistency	and	enjoys	both	an	autonomy	and	a	direction	of	its	own”	(1987,	380).	It	
is	because	of	this	that	for	one	to	feel	hope,	one	must	first	be	territorialized,	and	
without	territorialization,	there	can	be	no	hope.	This	is	not	to	say	that	without	pain,	
there	can	be	no	joy	because	pain	and	entrapment	are	not	synonymous,	nor	is	joy	the	
equivalent	of	freedom.	
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Freedom,	in	its	general	sense,	is	the	primary	myth	of	wage	labor	and	
capitalism.	The	new	freedom	is	about	freedom	within	the	system.	Althusser’s	
interpellation,	while	also	an	apparatus	of	the	system	to	maintain	itself,	also	presents	
a	method	of	movement	within	this	system:	subjects	can	de-interpellate	themselves	
as	one	subject	and	re-interpellate	themselves	into	a	different,	more	“free”	
subjectivity.	To	make	this	escape	of	de-interpellation	as	a	line	of	flight,	a	subject	
must	be	able	to	recognize	themselves	as	a	subject,	and	to	do	this	they	must	
recognize	an	outside	of	their	subjectivity.	Therefore,	while	individuals	cannot	
remove	themselves	from	the	system	itself,	there	are	gaps	in	the	framework	of	
control	through	which	subjects	can	find	a	path	to	a	new	subjectivity,	and	a	new	
freedom.	The	new	freedom	is	about	this	movement	between	and	within	
territorialization	and	the	lines	of	flight	that	produce	this	movement.	It	is	not	about	
escaping	to	somewhere	outside	of	the	system,	because	that	place	does	not	exist.	
Instead	it	is	the	motion	itself	that	produces	freedom.		
The	new	freedom	is	individual,	not	universal.	While	deterritorialization	as	a	
concept	has	the	potential	to	dismantle	power	structures,	the	individual	
deterritorialization	of	one	person	alone	does	not.	Even	when	subjects	think	they	are	
pursuing	freedom	in	their	own	lives,	they	are	just	reinforcing	the	system	that	
confines	them—interpellation.	In	order	to	subvert	the	system,	the	typical	process	of	
escape	must	be	subverted,	because	that	process	was	given	by	the	state,	and	
therefore	can	never	overcome	the	state,	while	simultaneously	making	the	individual	
think	they	have	found	a	potential	path	to	freedom	from	the	state	on	their	own.	The	
false	freedom	given	by	the	state	is	in	the	hope	of	getting	outside	of	the	system	to	
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destroy	it,	but	that	is	a	futile	conquest	because	the	Repressive	State	Apparatuses	of	
the	military	and	prison	system	are	too	strong	for	the	individual	to	destroy,	and	there	
is	no	complete	outside	from	the	state	because	of	the	Ideological	State	Apparatuses	
anyway.	It	can	only	be	cracked	from	within	by	infinite	individual	flight	lines	through	
the	structure.	That	is	why	I	define	a	new	freedom	for	individuals	in	the	world	today,	
one	that	does	not	require	subjects	to	abandon	every	part	of	the	life	they	knew	or	
sacrifice	their	personal	peace	and	happiness	for	the	greater	cause	of	overthrowing	
oppression.	There	is	a	freedom	that	exists	in	finding	the	loopholes	within	the	
oppression	and	living	a	free	life	unnoticed	by	those	in	power.	That	alone	does	not	
destabilize	anything,	even	though	it	does	not	necessarily	reinforce	it	either,	but	the	
hope	for	a	more	universal	degree	of	freedom	comes	in	only	when	many	subjects	
have	begun	to	pursue	their	own	personal	freedom.	Only	then	could	the	system	be	
dissolved	by	the	sheer	number	of	loopholes	poked	in	it.	Deterritorialization	happens	
through	lines	and	motion,	and	the	directions	of	motion	for	individuals	always	has	
more	potential	than	that	of	the	group.	This	is	due	to	the	fact	that	not	every	
individual	has	the	same	potential	for	freedom,	but	if	enough	bourgeoisie	subjects	do	
and	enough	pursue	that	potential,	in	that	way	the	structure	can	be	revolutionized	in	
its	entirety.	It's	a	kind	of	hope	within	the	hopelessness,	achieving	freedom	only	
when	the	direct	fight	for	it	is	discontinued.	This	new	freedom	only	creates	the	
potential	for	deterritorialization	and	therefore	the	possibility	of	a	new	hope,	but	it	
does	not	create	happiness	in	itself.	
A	new	happiness	isn’t	about	attaining	things	that	typically	mark	success:	
money,	power,	material	possessions,	freedom	from	society,	dreams,	or	ambitions.	It	
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is	about	living	within	the	rhizomatic	path	of	de-	and	re-territorialization,	finding	the	
fascination	and	freedom	in	the	shape	of	the	whole	as	it	goes,	and	enjoying	each	
moment	of	hope	by	reimagining	the	present	as	the	possibility	for	a	new	happiness.	
Finding	it	is	not	a	destination;	there	are	no	correct	versions;	each	person’s	
individual	life	line	is	always	already	“correct”	because	it	is	the	one	that	is.	The	
system	of	power	relations	determining	subjectivity	is	not	the	evil	entity	preventing	
happiness,	but	rather	the	machine	that	produces	it.	It	serves	as	a	direct	contrast	to	
the	new	free,	hopeful,	and	happy	subject,	but	in	this	way	gives	these	concepts	their	
meanings.	Outside	of	the	state	apparatus	there	is	nothing;	only	inside	is	there	
potential	for	a	meaningful	new	hope,	freedom,	or	happiness	because	only	inside	the	
machine	of	an	existing	context	can	meaning	be	produced	at	all.	
	
Conclusion	
A	new	happiness	is	not	a	lens,	but	it	is	a	way	of	viewing.	It	is	entirely	external	
but	is	entirely	produced	from	the	recognition	of	the	outside	by	the	inside.	“The	State	
gives	thought	a	form	of	interiority,	and	thought	gives	that	interiority	a	form	of	
universality”	(1987,	375),	but	the	only	thing	universal	about	a	new	happiness	is	that	
it	is	universally	not	universal.	It	is	distinctly	limited	in	its	form	but	unlimited	in	its	
affect.	It	is	not	a	resignation	to	fate	but	an	appreciation	of	the	entirety	of	the	past	
and	potential	futures	and	the	process	of	becoming	them.	It	does	not	hide	reality	or	
glorify/fetishize	it,	but	it	does	not	place	expectations	on	what	anything	should	be.	
“Dream	about	it	all,	expect	nothing,	and	enjoy	the	surprises”	(Jessie	Buckley).	The	
new	happiness	is	an	immanent	path	and	an	infinite	moment.	It	happens	all	at	once	
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but	goes	on	forever	because	it	is	the	process	that	brings	happiness,	but	like	a	
rhizome,	the	process	has	no	beginning,	end,	or	points	in	the	middle.	Hope,	
happiness,	and	freedom	are	all	interconnected,	but	none	of	them	spell	out	the	exact	
procedure	to	achieve	any	of	the	others	because	there	is	no	direction	of	movement	
between	these	concepts.	It	is	all	movement—freedom—which	cannot	exist	without	
the	moment	of	deterritorialization—hope—to	go	in	the	direction	of	a	new	
happiness,	which	is	the	process	of	all	of	this	itself,	but	there	are	no	steps	in	the	
process	because	it	is	always	already	in	action	anyway.		
This	analysis	does	not	teach	anything.	“[She]	who	is	writing	these	lines	and	
the	reader	who	reads	them	are	themselves	subjects”	(Althusser,	299).	There	are	no	
outsider-perspective	secrets	to	life	here,	because	none	of	it	can	ever	occur	outside.	It	
has	nothing	to	do	with	the	discipline	of	psychology;	the	philosophy	has	no	pretense	
of	advice.	It	is	merely	productive:	of	meanings	in	literature,	concepts	based	on	these	
meanings,	and	the	new	meanings	that	these	concepts	produce	again.	It	is	like	a	cycle	
in	that	it	has	no	beginning	or	end,	but	it	is	a	rhizome	in	that	it	departs	in	the	middle	
without	any	points	of	departure.	This	is	not	a	metaphor,	but	a	directly	literal	
observation.	Hope,	happiness,	and	freedom,	too,	are	not	metaphors,	either	in	the	
literature	or	in	real	life.	They	are	machines	produced	by	machines,	producing	more	
machines.	Their	ability	to	produce	affect	does	not	stop	when	they	are	out	of	the	
context	of	the	literature,	just	as	this	essay	does	not	end	when	there	are	no	more	
words	on	the	page,	which	is	going	to	happen	now.	 	
 
 
43	
	
References	
	
	
Althusser,	Louis.	“Ideology	and	Ideological	State	Apparatuses.”	In	Literary	Theory:	
	 An	Anthology,	edited	by	Julie	Rivkin	and	Michael	Ryan,	2nd	ed.	Blackwell	
	 Publishing,	2004.	
	
“Actress	Jessie	Buckley	On	Her	Character's	Dark	Role	In	'Beast'.”	All	Things	
	 Considered.	National	Public	Radio,	May	11,	2018.	
	
Buchanan,	Ian,	and	John	Marks.	Deleuze	and	Literature	(Deleuze	Connections	EUP).	
	 Edinburgh:	Edinburgh	University	Press,	2006.	
	
Deleuze,	Gilles.	“Bartleby;	Or,	The	Formula.”	In	Essays	Critical	and	Clinical,	translated	
	 by	Daniel	W	Smith	and	Michael	A	Greco,	68–90.	Minneapolis:	University	of	
	 Minnesota	Press,	1997.	
	
Deleuze,	Gilles,	and	Guattari	Félix.	A	Thousand	Plateaus.	Translated	by	Brian	
	 Massumi.	Minneapolis:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	1987.	
	
Deleuze	and	Guattari	Studies	:	Edinburgh	University	Press.	Accessed	February	26,	
	 2020.	https://www.euppublishing.com/loi/dlgs.	
	
Dostoyevsky,	Fyodor.	White	Nights	and	Other	Stories	(version	EBook	#36034).	
	 Translated	by	Constance	Garnett.	Vol.	X.	Project	Gutenberg,	2011.	
	
Green,	John.	Paper	Towns.	New	York,	NY:	Penguin	Group,	2012.	
	
Massumi,	Brian.	A	User's	Guide	to	Capitalism	and	Schizophrenia:	Deviations	from	
	 Deleuze	and	Guattari.	Swerve	ed.	Cambridge,	MA:	MIT	Press,	1992.	
	
Montgomery,	Lucy	Maud.	Anne	of	Green	Gables.	Puffin	Books,	2015.	
